To add another layer to its deterrence strategy, Taipei should strengthen security ties with like-minded partners while upholding cordial ties with the US.
Huỳnh Tâm Sáng - Triệu Chí Phong
17/06/2026
Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te inspected Han Kuang exercises in 2025 and HIMARS launchers fire rockets during exercise in Taichung (behind) on June 10 - (C): Taiwan Presidential Office/CNA
In May, acting US Secretary of Navy Hung Cao announced the postponement of a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Cao said the pause was to make sure the US had enough munitions needed for the Operation Epic Fury attack on Iran.
Cao’s justification at a congressional hearing, occurring shortly after President Donald Trump’s trip to China, raised concerns about Washington’s true motives. Before the trip, Trump stated that he had not yet decided on the fate of the weapon package with Taipei, leaving open the possibility of using the delay in arms sales to Taiwan as a “negotiating chip” with China.
Despite adhering to the “one-China” policy and refraining from conducting formal diplomatic relations with Taipei since 1979, Washington remains a major arms supplier to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act, which stipulates that the US will provide Taiwan with arms of “defensive character,” remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship.
For years, the US has provided Taiwan with numerous large arms deals, including advanced military equipment. The scale of these arms sales increased significantly under President Donald Trump. During his first term, Trump approved major arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 new F-16V fighters worth US$8 billion in 2019, followed in 2020 by Harpoon coastal defense systems, HIMARS rocket artillery, and advanced sensor systems. Last December, the Trump administration announced a huge arms package worth $11 billion to Taiwan.
For Taiwan, US arms sales not only enhance its defense capabilities but also strengthen the US-Taiwan security relationship. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, heavy equipment such as fighter jets, long-range missiles, and air defense systems could help bolster Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities while buying time for the self-governed island to survive China’s initial attacks.
Additionally, these weapons would serve as deterrence, forcing China to carefully weigh the cost of taking Taiwan by force against the conceivable benefits. Therefore, the stalling of arms deals, potentially including Patriot (PAC-3) interceptor missiles, the National Advanced Air Defense System (NASAMS), TOW anti-tank missiles, and Javelin anti-tank missiles, would weaken Taiwan’s defense capabilities and embolden China’s resolve to exhaust Taiwan with coercion and “gray zone” blockades.
For decades, the deterrence supported by US security assistance and arms sales to Taiwan has helped deter China from taking Taiwan by force. This strategic deterrence, coupled with Taiwan’s decision not to formally declare independence, has maintained peace across the Taiwan Strait despite China’s unwavering hostility toward Taiwan. This status quo has also been beneficial for the US, which has real leverage on both Beijing and Taipei.
A halt in arms sales to Taiwan is a strategic blow because it risks changing China’s view of the military balance, making the use of force against Taiwan seem more appealing. Beijing could exploit this military gap to exert political pressure and force Taiwan to make concessions or drift out of Washington’s sphere of influence.
Moreover, Beijing could seek further US concessions by treating Taiwan as a bargaining chip, thereby weakening the US leverage in supporting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, in the eyes of US allies and partners, the failure to provide defense weapons to Taiwan could be seen as a sign of weakness or declining American credibility and power vis-à-vis China.
Whether the US is pursuing an accommodationist policy that could eventually hamper its relations with allies in the region, notably the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia, is being debated across the region.
Despite concerns about a shift in Washington’s Taiwan policy, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has reaffirmed “the rock-solid relationship” between Taiwan and the US while urging Washington to continue arms sales to Taiwan. Meanwhile, Alexander Tah-ray Yui, Taiwan’s representative to the US, has expressed confidence that the Trump administration would soon approve a new round of arms deliveries to Taiwan.
By underlining the importance of the US-Taiwan relationship, Lai’s government has likely attempted to allay doubts over Washington’s decision to pause arms sales. The incumbent administration has every reason to maintain momentum in US-Taiwan relations. For Taipei, protecting Taiwan’s 23 million people depends not only on its defense preparations, but also on sustained US engagement in times of crisis.
Though it is still too early to conclude whether the delay in Washington’s arms package for Taiwan reflects a shift in the US policy, this limbo puts the uncertainty and unpredictability of the Trump administration’s foreign policy in the spotlight.
Taiwan cannot build its security strategy solely on Washington’s commitments. While US support remains indispensable, Taipei needs a wider deterrence network that can reduce the risks caused by Trump’s transactional diplomacy.
Therefore, Taiwan should strengthen ties with other US allies in the region, particularly Japan and the Philippines. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi underlined that an attack on Taiwan could pose an “existential threat” to Japan. In such a scenario, Japan could even deploy its self-defense forces without violating Article 9 of its post-war constitution. Close-knit relations between Taiwan and Japan provide Taipei with additional support for its broader deterrence strategy.
At the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said that Manila is pursuing close defense ties with Taiwan to counter China’s “nefarious plan.” The two partners should step up collaboration through joint exercises and coast guard operations to enhance interoperability, maritime domain awareness, and crisis response.
Multilateral cooperative activities involving Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan could enhance regional defense strategies, given that they share regional security risks and are seeking quiet defensive cooperation.
As Taiwan’s security remains highly dependent on US political will, Taipei should continue urging Washington to honor its commitments while deepening security ties with like-minded partners, particularly Japan and the Philippines. By doing so, Taipei can ensure that its deterrence strategy does not rise or fall with the calculations of one administration.
Huỳnh Tâm Sáng - Triệu Chí Phong
Không có nhận xét nào